Expanded Concepts of State Jurisdiction over Non-Residents: The Illinois Revised Practice Act by O\u27Connor, John M.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 31 | Issue 2 Article 4
3-1-1956
Expanded Concepts of State Jurisdiction over Non-
Residents: The Illinois Revised Practice Act
John M. O'Connor
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
John M. O'Connor, Expanded Concepts of State Jurisdiction over Non-Residents: The Illinois Revised Practice Act, 31 Notre Dame L. Rev.
223 (1956).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol31/iss2/4
EXPANDED CONCEPTS OF STATE JURISDICTION
OVER NON-RESIDENTS: THE
ILLINOIS REVISED PRACTICE ACT
Since before 18501 successive attempts have been made
by various states to adjudicate certain classes of contro-
versies between their citizens and non-resident defendants.
As time passed the sound policy considerations underlying
this oblique demand for power were strengthened by "the
present day extensions of business into the various states
and the rapidity of commuting interstate."2 The rigid
due process barriers erected by the Supreme Court in
Pennoyer v. Neff' were whittled away until finally the
Supreme Court, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,4
adopted a new concept of due process, and thereby ma-
terially increased the power of a state to assert jurisdiction
over non-residents in actions in personam.
Even before the International Shoe case, jurisdiction over
non-residents was being extended in a few states,5 - and
after that case more states began to press toward the new
limits of the due process clause.6 With the passage of its
revised Civil Practice Act,7 effective January 1, 1956,
Illinois becomes the first state to carry its jurisdiction over
non-residents virtually to the full limits permitted by the
due process clause as presently interpreted.'
1 D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 US. (11 How.) 165 (1850).
Wein v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P.2d 222, 230 (1948).
3 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 88 (d) (1951); VT. REV. STAT. § 1562 (1947).
6 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-340 (1947). See also Utah Laws 1947, c. 10,
§§ 2, 3 (later repealed by Utah Laws 1951, c. 58, § 3 and now appearing In a
modified form in UTAH R. Civ. P. See notes 81-83 infra).
7 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 110, §§ 1-101.72 (1955).
S In interpreting the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and therefore the limits of Illinois jurisdiction over non-residents, the fed-
eral decisions on due process control. Pembleton v. Illinois Commercial
Men's Ass'n, 289 M. 99, 124 N.. 355 (1919), cert. dismissed, 253 U.S. 499
(1920).
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• I
THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Section 17 of the Civil Practice Act provides a compre-
hensive scheme whereby Illinois courts may assert jurisdic-
tion over non-residents in in persomzm actions.9 The
statute applies equally to residents and non-residents and
provides that a person, or the personal representative of
an individual, submits to the jurisdiction of Illinois courts
as to any cause of action arising from the doing, either
in person or through an agent, of any of the following:
(1) The transaction of any business within the state;
(2) The commission of a tortious act within the state;
(3) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate
situated in the state;
(4) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk
located within the state at the time of contracting.
While some overlap in the cases enumerated is ap-
parent,'0 complete coverage is assured; and the courts of
Illinois may adjudicate all controversies arising out of a
non-resident's contacts with the state."
Section 17(3) limits jurisdiction to causes of action
arising out of the enumerated activities.' A plaintiff is
thus precluded from using jurisdiction obtained under
section 17 as a basis for asserting unrelated causes of
action. This protection is afforded the defendant only; and
he is not precluded from counterclaiming for damages
on a cause of action completely alien to those enumerated
9 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 110, § 17 (1955).
10 Thus, most cases arising out of ownership, use, or possession of Illi-
nois realty arise also out .of the transaction of business in Illinois, or out
of an Illinois tort.
11 Claims falling within the enumerated categories may be asserted in
an original action or by third party proceedings. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 110, § 25(1955).
12 Id. at § 17(3): "Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated
herein may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction
over him is based upon this section."
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in section 17,' just as he might file a separate action
to recover on his unrelated claim.
Process may be served on a person who has submitted
to the jurisdiction of Illinois courts under section 17 only
by personal service of the summons,' 4 together with a
copy of the complaint. 5 Service may be made outside the
state without an order of court by any person over 21 years
of age who is not a party to the action. 8 The new act thus
departs from traditional notions of process, exemplified
by the cumbersome substituted service of the Non-Resi-
dent Motorist Act,' 7 a service justified on a theory of con-
sent now acknowledged to be fictional.'
The broad extension of jurisdiction created by section
17 necessitates some examination of the constitutional
limits of a state's permissible jurisdiction. These limits
are fixed on two distinct levels.' 9 Neither (1) the assertion
of jurisdiction itself, nor (2) the manner in which it is
asserted may exceed the limits imposed by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
II
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON JURISDICTION
The due process clause first appeared as a limitation
on the power of a state to assert jurisdiction over non-
13 Id. at § 38. Principles of fairness suggest that when an unrelated coun-
terclaim is urged by a section 17 defendant, the plaintiff may then assert
additional clainis other than those enumerated in section 17. However, the
statute does not expressly cover this situation.
14 Id. at § 17(2).
15 Id. at § 101.5, Supreme Court Rule 5.
36 Id. at § 16.
17 ILL. Rav. STAT. c. 95%, § 23 (1953). Section 17 (4) of the Civil Practice
Act continues existing methods of service. Thus, in an automobile case
covered by the Non-Resident Motorist Act, the plaintiff may serve a non-
resident defendant by personal service under section 17 or by service on
the secretary of state.
18 Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 IM. 591, 114 N.E.2d 686 (1953).
19 McBaine, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: Actions Arising
Out of Acts Done Within the Forum, 34 CAL. L. Rav. 331, 340-1 (1946).
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residents in Pennoyer v. Neff,2" where the Supreme Court,
in effect, held that a valid personal judgment could not
be entered against a defendant without service of process
within the state. This virtual prohibition on the assertion
of jurisdiction was no novelty, but rather another expres-
sion of the so-called "power" theory of jurisdiction.'
A geographical limitation on jurisdiction is singularly
inappropriate to jurisdiction over foreign corporations, and
even before Pennoyer v. Neff, a fiction had been developed
to avoid this stringent jurisdictional limitation.22 With
the passage of time and the increased interstate activities
of corporations, new theories were devised and expanded,
modifying the basic rule. Thus, the states exercised in
personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations, while
paying lip service to Pennoyer v. Neff, through the fictions
that the corporation, by reason of its activities in the
state "consented"' to service in the state or was "pres-
ent" for jurisdictional purposes.
The local activities of foreign corporations were suf-
ficient to supply the fictional "consent" or "presence" to
satisfy the requirements of due process if the corporation
was "doing business" in the state asserting jurisdiction. 5
A number of cases involving applications of the "doing
business" test resulted in the evolution of two rules:
"mere solicitation" did not constitute doing business,'
9o 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
21 For an excellent discussion of the "power" theory and of the consti-
tutional development of due process, see: Cleary & Seder, Extended Juris-
dictional Bases for the Illinois Courts, 50 Nw. U. L. REV. 599 (1955); and
Cleary, Service of Process for Personal Judgments, 37 IEJ. BAR J. 236
(1948-49).
22 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
23 Ibid.
24 Green v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907).
25 "Doing business" for jurisdictional purposes is distinguishable from
"doing business" for purposes of domesticating a corporation. Most state
courts apply different tests to the same facts, depending on the purpose.
See Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d 615 (1951).
26 Green v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907).
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but "solicitation plus" other activities in the state con-
stituted doing business.2'
For a time following Pennoyer v. Neff no successful
effort was made to dilute its limitation on jurisdiction
over non-resident individuals. A few cases were finally
presented to the Supreme Court, and after one failure,2'
two inroads were made. In Hess v. Pawloskil9 the Court
sustained the Massachusetts Non-Resident Motorist Act,
which provided that by his use of the highways of the
state, a non-resident impliedly consented to the appoint-
ment of an appropriate state official to accept service
of process in causes of action arising out of his use of the
highways. Later, in Doherty v. Goodman,30 the Court
affirmed a personal judgment against a non-resident in-
dividual on a case arising out of his doing business in the
state where service of process had been made on a resi-
dent agent of the defendant under an Iowa statute.
These cases did not substantially weaken the doctrine
of Pennoyer v. Neff as it affected non-resident individuals;
for in Hess v. Pawloski the Court emphasized the danger-
ous character of motor vehicles, and the interest of the
states in their regulation, and in Doherty v. Goodman
the cause of action arose out of the non-resident's securi-
ties business in Iowa, a business which the Court noted was
subject to special regulation in that state.
For many years the concept of "doing business" flour-
ished as a technique for evading the impractical due
process limitations on jurisdiction over non-residents.
Thousands of cases defined and refined the concept until
an esoteric lore had accumulated around it. Finally, in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,"1 the Supreme
27 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
28 Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
29 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
30 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
31 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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Court discarded the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff and
established a completely new concept of the due process
limitations on jurisdiction over non-resident individuals
and foreign corporations. The Court thus wiped the slate
clean and "marked a change in the judicial climate."32
In the International Shoe case the Court, having ex-
posed the fiction of the "consent" and "presence" theories,
declared:
... due process requires only that in order to subject a de-
fendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain mini-
mum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. . ...,3
Significantly, the only positive limitation placed on the
assumption of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
by this case is that due process ". . . does not contemplate
that a state may make binding a judgment in personam
against an individual or corporate defendant with which
the state has no contacts, ties or relations."'
The doctrine thus established rests not on the old
"power" theory of jurisdiction, but on the theory that
having received the benefits of the laws of a state, a non-
resident cannot avoid their obligations.'
The Court did not attempt the creation of a mechanical
test for determining the minimum contacts requisite to
the assertion of jurisdiction, but said, in effect, that the
court must ".. . balance the conflicting interests involved:
i.e., whether the gain to the plaintiff in retaining the
action where it was, outweighed the burden imposed upon
the defendant; or vice versa.''3
32 Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664,
25 A.L.R.2d 1193 (1951).
33 326 U.S. 310 at 316 (1945).
34 Id. at 319.
35 See note 41 infra.
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Clearly the Court discarded,37 without expressly over-
ruling,3" the "doing business" test which had been used
to determine the due process limitations on jurisdiction
over foreign corporations.3 9
Occasionally it has been urged that the principles of this
case do not apply to non-resident individuals because it
involved a corporate defendant. This theory is based on a
supposed distinction between foreign corporations and
non-resident individuals for jurisdictional purposes, a
phtently false distinction in view of the language and
philosophy of the opinion in the case.4"
In the International Shoe case the Court further indi-
cated that isolated activity might subject a foreign corpora-
tion to local suit if the cause of action arose out of that
36 'Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry., 166 F.2d 788, 790-1 (2d Cir. 1948). In
this case, Judge Hand points out the identity between this test and that
involved in a plea of "forum non conveniens."
37 Compania de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d
357, 365-6 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
38 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 at 319 (1945):
"It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary
line between those activities which justify the subjection of a cor-
poration to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechani-
cal or quantitative."
39 One court has said that while the International Shoe case adopted a
more liberal interpretation of "doing business," it also gives some support
to the view that mere solicitation will not support jurisdiction, since the
defendant there was engaged in regular and systematic solicitation which
resulted in a continuous flow of its products into the state. Goldstein v. Chi-
cago R. I. & P. R.R., 93 F. Supp. 671 (W.D.N.Y. 1950). This complete dis-
regard of the language in the International Shoe case has gained no fol-
lowing.
40 See Cleary & Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois
Courts, 50 Nw. U. L. REv. 599 (1955). Dubin v. Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C.
61, 65-66 (1939), and Wein v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P.2d 222, 229-30
(1948), rejected attempted limitations on a court's jurisdiction over non-
resident individuals. One court suggested that a distinction may exist be-
tween corporations and individuals as to the sufficiency of the contacts to
warrant subjecting the non-resident to suit, but the court did not doubt the
applicability of the International Shoe case to individuals. Compania de
Astral, SA. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
19561
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
activity.4
Subequently, in Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, "
the Supreme Court again condemned the "consent" and
"presence" theories,43 applying the "fair play and sub-
stantial justice" criteria." The Court held that Virginia's
assertion of jurisdiction over a non-resident insurance
company having no resident agents but engaged in the
mail order solicitation of business in Virginia, by service,
pursuant to statute, upon a state official, did not violate
the due process clause.
Because the International Shoe case involved the col-
lection of state unemployment compensation contributions,
41 The Court said, 326 U.S. at 318:
"Finally, although the commission of some single or occasional
acts of the corporate agent in a state sufficient to impose an obliga-
tion or liability on the corporation has not been thought to confer
upon the state authority to enforce it, Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v.
Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, other such acts, because of their
nature and quality and the circumstances of their commission, may
be deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit."
It also pointed out that single or isolated items of activity are not enough
to subject one to suit in the state "on causes of action unconnected with the
activities there," 326 U.S. at 317; and then went on to say, 326 US. at 319:
"[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of con-
ducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protec-
tion of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give
rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are
connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which
requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce
them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue" (Emphasis
added.)
This refutes any argument that this case does not approve the assertion of
jurisdiction over non-residents when the contact has been a single isolated
act. Several courts have considered and rejected the argument, permitting
jurisdiction for the adjudication of a cause of action arising out of the par-
ticular act on which jurisdiction is based. Compania de Astral, S.A. v. Boston
Metals Co., note 37 supra; Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., note
32 supra.
42 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
43 "Metaphysical concepts of 'implied consent' and 'presence' in a
state should not be solidified into a constitutional barrier against
Virginia's simple, direct and fair plan for service of process on the
Secretary of the Commonwealth." Travelers Health Ass'n v. Vir-
ginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950).
44 In spite of the Supreme Court, the "consent" fiction persists. See Wein
v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P.2d 222, 230 (1948).
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and the Travelers Health Ass'n case involved the insurance
business, it has been suggested that the doctrine of these
cases is limited to matters peculiarly subject to state regu-
lation and those in which the state has a direct interest.45
This distinction is not supported by the broad language
of the majority opinion in the International Shoe case.46
During the period between Pennoyer v. Neff4  and
the International Shoe case, there accumulated a myriad
of state court decisions as to what constituted "doing
business." Since the International Shoe case some federal
courts have applied these state court decisions in diversity
cases,48 thereby frequently following the old "doing busi-
ness" rule.49 Other federal courts have measured juris-
diction solely by the standards laid down in the Inter-
-national Shoe case. ' The correct approach depends upon
45 The concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in the Travelers Health
Ass'n case limiting the holding to validity of state regulation of solicitation,
affords some support for this view. 339 U.S. at 651. See also: Watson v. Em-
ployers Liab. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954), rehearing denied, 348 U.S. 921
(1955); Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 Fl2d 518 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 877 (1953); Gillioz v. Klncannon, 213 Ark. 1010,
214 S.W.2d 212, 215 (1948). This is the distinction which received such wide
acceptance in connection with Hess v. Pawlosld, note 29 supra, and Doherty
v. Goodman, note 30 supra.
46 See also Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d
615, 624 (1951), rejecting that distinction.
47 Note 3 supra.
48 Thus, it has been said that whether a corporation is "doing business"
within the limits of the due process clause differs from whether it is "doing
business" within the statutes and decisions of the particular state for juris-
dictional purposes. The one is the question how far the state may go; the
other, how far it will go. It frequently happens that the law of a state will
not extend jurisdiction as amply as it has power to do. Bornze v. Nardis
Sportswear Co., 165 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948).
49 Riverbank Laboratories v. Hardwood Products Corp., 220 F.2d 465
(7th Cir. 1955); Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir.
1953); Canvas Fabricators, Inc. v. Win E. Hooper & Sons Co., 199 F.2d 485
(7th Cir. 1952); Rosenthal v. Frankfort Distillers Corp., 193 F.2d 137 (5th
Cir. 1951); Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948);
Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, Inc., 165 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948).
50 Scholnik v. National Airlines, Inc., 219 F.2d 115 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 349 U.S. 956 (1955); Woodworkers Tool Works v. Byrne, 191 F.2d 667
(9th Cir. 1951); Clover Leaf Freight Lines, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Whole-
salers Ass'n, 166 F.2d 626 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 823 (1948); Nugey
v. Paul-Lewis Laboratories, 132 F. Supp. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Satterfield
v. LeHigh Valley R.R., 128 F. Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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the nature of these state court decisions." They were at
least colored by the then prevailing constitutional doctrine,
and may have been no more than applications of that
doctrine. If they are regarded simply as expressions as
to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, they
have lost their vigor under the International Shoe case.
If, however, they constitute independent expressions of
state law, they are presumably binding upon the federal
courts in diversity cases under Erie v. Tompkins.52 No
final determination of this question has yet been made.
It is at least clear that where the state legislature has
enacted a statute governing the assertion of jurisdiction
over non-resid.nts that statute will control even though
it does not assert jurisdiction to the full limits permitted
by the due process clause.' In section 17 the Illinois
legislature has designated a series of situations giving rise
to jurisdiction over non-residents. The transaction of
business in the state and the ownership of real property
in the state constitute minimum contacts within the
International Shoe case. The commission of a tortious act
in the state represents an extension of Hess v. Pawloski
within the philosophy of the International Shoe case, and
the fourth classification (i.e., the insuring of any risk
located within the state) is clearly supported by the
Travelers Health Ass'n case. In all of these situations,
jurisdiction is based upon certain minimum contacts be-
tween the non-resident and the state, and it is limited
to causes of action arising out of these minimum con-
51 Where the particular state statute involved is sufficiently broad so that
it does not require a construction of "doing business" which varies from
the federal constitutional interpretation of that phrase, jurisdiction may be
measured by the standards of the International Shoe case. Electrical Equip-
ment Co. v. Daniel Harm Drayage Co, 217 F2d 656 (8th Cir. 1954).
52 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Moore apparently regards the Erie rule as inap-
plicable. MooRE, FEDER. PRACTIcc § 4.25 (2d ed. 1948).
53 The state need not assert jurisdiction to the limits of the due process
clause. It may assert or decline jurisdiction. Perkins v. Bengdlet Consol,
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 917 (1952).
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tacts.' It is obviously consistent with traditional notions
of fair play to require that actions ordinarily involving
Illinois witnesses and Illinois law be tried in the state
where interest is most direct and immediate. There ac-
cordingly appears to be no question concerning the con-
situtionality of section 17 so far as the assertion of
jurisdiction is concerned.
I
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AS TO NOTICE
IN ASSERTING JURISDICTION
Pennoyer v. Neff" held that the process of a court of
one state could not run into another and summon a party
there to respond to proceedings against him. This doctrine
continued undisturbed for many years and necessitated
the development of the fictional appointment of a state
officer as an agent to receive process, a concept which
reached the height of its popularity with the Non-Resi-
dent Motorist Acts.'
The breakdown in this geographical limitation on proc-
ess occurred in Milliken v. Meyer,5" where the Court ap-
proved personal service in Colorado of Wyoming process
on a defendant who was domiciled in Wyoming. The Court
held that due process required no more than a method of
service reasonably calculated to afford the defendant
actual knowledge of the proceedings and an opportunity
5A It would not violate due process for a state either to take or decline
jurisdiction in a suit against a foreign corporation carrying on a continuous
and systematic but limited part of its general business in the state on a
cause of action not arising out of the corporation's business in the state.
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444-445, 447-448, re-
hearing denied, 343 U.S. 917 (1952). Thus, section 17 does not in all cases
assert jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the due process clause.
55 Note 3 supra.
56 See IL. REv. STAT. c. 95%, § 23 (1955).
57 311 U.S. 457 (1940), rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 712 (1941).
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to defend."
Later, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co.,59 a proceeding for the judicial settlement of accounts
of a common trust fund, the Supreme Court held that
notice by publication was valid as to non-resident bene-
ficiaries whose interests or whereabouts could not be
ascertained with due diligence. The Court there reasserted
the due process test laid down in Milliken v. Meyer, hold-
ing that the requirements of due process were met if the
service employed was reasonably calculated under all the
circumstances to give defendant actual notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
The section 17 requirement that defendant be personally
served with process is much more "reasonably calculated
to apprise" a non-resident of the pending litigation than
the registered mail service approved in the International
Shoe'° and Travelers Health Ass'n6 cases. Since a copy
of the complaint must be served with the summons, the
requirements of due process are more than met.'
IV
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The commerce clause imposes a limitation on the
extent to which a state may interfere with interstate com-
merce, but it does not invalidate section 17, since that
58 "Its adequacy so far as due process is concerned is dependent on
whether or not the form of substituted service provided for such
cases and employed is reasonably calculated to give him actual no-
tice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. If it is, the
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice . . . implicit
in due process are satisfied." 311 U.S. 457 at 463.
59 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
0 Note 4 supra.
61 Note 42 supra.
62 Allen v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 2d 306, 259 P.2d 905, 909 (1953):
"... for no more certain provision for defendant's receipt of actual
notice of the institution of litigation against him could be made than
through the specified personal service of process. Milliken v. Meyer,
supra, 311 U.S. 457, 463; 61 S.Ct. 339; see 40 Cal. L. Rev. 156."
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section is specifically restricted to causes of action arising
out of the enumerated acts in Illinois.6
A judgment in a case where jurisdiction is based on
section 17 will be enforced in other states under the full
faith and credit clause. Although the question of the juris-
diction of the Illinois court under section 17 depends on
an adjudication as to the merits (viz., whether the de-
fendant has committed a tortious act in Illinois), a de-
fendant cannot relitigate this issue in the foreign forum
in which the judgment is sought to be enforced.64
V
PRECEDENTS
Other states have statutes asserting jurisdiction in one
or more of the four classes enumerated in section 17, and
some of these statutes predate the International Shoe
case. Section 17 is unique in that it constitutes the first
effort to combine the scattered provisions in a single com-
prehensive scheme for the assertion of jurisdiction over
63 In International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914), the
Court said at 588-9:
"True, it has been held time and again that a State cannot bur-
den interstate commerce or pass laws which amount to the regula-
tion of such commerce; but this is a long way from holding that
the ordinary process of the courts may not reach corporations
carrying on business within the State which is wholly of an inter-
state commerce character."
".... We are satisfied that the presence of a corporation within a
State necessary to the service of process is shown when it appears
that the corporation is there carrying on business in such sense as
to manifest its presence within the State, although the business
transacted may be entirely interstate in its character. In other words,
this fact alone does not render the corporation immune from the
ordinary process of the courts of the State."
This case was decided under the "presence?' theory of submission to juris-
diction, but the change effected by the International Shoe case does not
weaken the holding of this case on the interstate commerce point. See also
Davis v. Farmers' Co-operative Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923).
64 Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
65 See Cleary & Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois
Courts, 50 Nw. U. L. ryEv. 599 (1955).
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non-residents.6 6
(1) The Transaction of Any Business Within This State. 7
In asserting jurisdiction over causes of action arising out
of the transaction of business within the state, Illinois has
departed from the traditional "doing business" basis of
jurisdiction and has moved toward the outer limits of its
constitutional power."8 The term "transaction of business"
includes all cases which meet the older "doing business"
test of jurisdiction as well as cases where the defendant's
activities amount to something less than "doing busi-
ness."69 However, under the old test, once a defendant was
66 Compare the English rules which permit service on a non-resident
by registered mail, upon leave of court, where:
(1) A contract has been made in the jurisdiction by an agent who
carries on business in the jurisdiction on behalf of the non-resident.
1 ANNUAL PRACTiCE, Order 9, R. 8 (a) (1949).
(2) The subject matter of the litigation is land located within
the jurisdiction. Id. Order 11, R. 1 (a).
(3) Any act, deed, will, contract, obligation or liability affecting
land in the jurisdiction is sought to be construed, set aside or en-
forced. Id. Order 11, R. 1 (b).
(4) Relief is sought against a person domiciled within the juris-
diction. Id. Order 11, R. 1 (c).
(5) The action is brought against a defendant not domiciled in
Scotland, based on a contract (1) made within the jurisdiction or
through an agent in the jurisdiction on behalf of a non-resident
principal; or (2) governed by English law; or (3) breached out-
side the jurisdiction rendering impossible the performance of part of
the contract which ought to be performed within the jurisdiction.
Id. Order 11, R. 1(e).
(6) A tort is committed within the jurisdiction. Id. Order 11,
R. 1 (ee).
(7) An injunction is sought as to anything to be done within
the jurisdiction or a nuisance within the jurisdiction is sought to
be prevented. Id. Order 11, R. 1(f).
(8) The non-resident is a necessary party to an action properly
brought against some person duly served within the jurisdiction.
Id. Order 11, R. 1 (g).
67 ILL. REv. STAT. c. 110, § 17(1) (a) (1955).
6s Cleary & Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois Courts,
50 Nw. U. L. Rsv. 599 (1955).
69 In defining the term "transaction of business," the "doing business"
cases may not be ignored, particularly where the court found against the
defedant on this issue.
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"doing business" general jurisdiction could attach?0 Illinois
limits its jurisdiction to causes of action arising out of
defendant's transaction of business in the state, and thus
does not reach the limit of its constitutidnal power in the
"doing business" case.
There are no precise standards for the measurement of
the extent to which jurisdiction has been expanded. The
court, in determining whether the cause of action before it
arose out of defendant's transaction of business in the state,
will apply substantially the same test as is used for due
process purposes.'
Most of the comparable provisions in other states 2 cling
to the more limited "doing business" test of jurisdiction
over non-residents.73 These statutes have historical signifi-
cance in the development of expanded jurisdiction, but
they do not measure the scope of the Illinois provision.
Other provisions have a more direct bearing.
With reference to the "doing business" test, Maryland
has gone a little further than Illinois, not only abandoning
but expressly disavowing this concept of jurisdiction. In
Maryland, a foreign corporation is subject to suit by a
resident ".... on any cause of action arising out of a contract
made within this State or a liability incurred for acts done
within this state, whether or not such foreign corporation
is doing or has done business in this State."'7 In the event
that the foreign corporation does not have a resident agent
70 See note 54 supra.
71 Note 68 supra.
2 Miss. CODE ANN. § 1437 (1942); ARE. STAT. AN. § 27-340 (1947). The
Mississippi statute does not go as far in asserting jurisdiction as due process
permitted before the International Shoe case.
73 Mississippi Wood Preserving Co. v. Rothschild, 201 F.2d 233 (5th Cir.
1953); Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d 615 (1951).
74 MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 88(d) (1951). This is in addition to provi-
sions subjecting foreign corporations "doing business" in Maryland to juris-
diction there without much distinction between a resident plaintiff and a
non-resident plaintiff. Id. § 88(a), (b) and (c). These provisions are not
pertinent because they are not comparable to section 17.
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or its resident agent cannot be served, process may be
served on the defendant by service on the state tax
commission."
The Maryland statute is in effect a combination of sec-
tions 17(1) (a) 76 and 17(1) (b)77 and thus covers vir-
tually the same cases as are covered by two of Illinois'
four new bases for jurisdiction.
The Maryland statute, however, so far as actions arising
out of contracts are concerned, does not require that the
liability asserted be based upon acts within the state. Such
a requirement is explicitly stated with respect to other
actions. The Illinois statute contains no express require-
ment that the acts upon which liability is founded, as
distinguished from the conduct which establishes jurisdic-
tion, must occur within the state. There is thus at least a
possibility that the Illinois provision may extend to cases
not covered by the Maryland statute.7" Another apparent
difference arises from the fact that the Maryland statute
speaks of "any acts done within this State" without re-
striction. Section 17 of the Illinois act, on the other hand,
enumerates four specific types of conduct giving rise to
jurisdiction. While the specific enumeration of the Illinois
statute may at first blush suggest that it is less compre-
hensive than the generalized provision of the Maryland
act, the breadth of the kind of conduct which the Illinois
statute describes is such that no difference in scope will
probably result.
In at least two respects, the Maryland provision is more
75 Id. at § 92 (d).
76 Jurisdiction founded on the transaction of any business within the
state.
77 Jurisdiction founded on the commission of a tortious act within the
state.
78 Whether or not an actual difference exists in the cases covered by
the two provisions depends (1) on the interpretation of the Illinois Act
(i.e., whether the term "transaction of any business" requires that the op-
erative act giving rise to the cause of action occur in Illinois); and (2) on
the Maryland court's definition of the phrase "acts ...within the state."
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restricted than section 17. In Maryland, the plaintiff
must be a resident of (or have a usual place of business
in) the state and the defendant must be a foreign cor-
poration.7 9
The validity of the Maryland statute was unsuccessfully
challenged in a case where jurisdiction was founded on a
contract made in that state. 0 The opinion of the Maryland
court, relying on the rule announced in the International
Shoe case "by which the jurisdiction of Maryland is to be
tested" did not emphasize any of the features which
distinguish that statute from section 17.
Utah asserts general jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion "doing business" in the state8 ' and by a separate
statute over a non-resident person who ". . . is associated
in and conducts business within the state of Utah in one
or more places in his own name or a common trade name,"
as to any action arising out of his conduct of the business.8 2
Process must be served within the state on the defendant
or his agent, in the case of an individual, 3 and on the
person "doing business" or in charge of the office or place
of business in the case of a foreign corporation.'
The language of the Utah provision is probably broad
enough to authorize the assertion of jurisdiction where
something less than the continued activities of the "doing
business" test is present. However, there has been a tend-
ency to confine jurisdiction to cases where the traditional
'79 Note 74 supra.
80 Compania de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d
357 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955). The statute had previously been
sustained in a tort action. Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F.
Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950). But cf. note 109 infra.
81 UTAH R. Civ. P. 4 (e) (4), 9 UTAH CoDE AwNr. 460 (1953).
82 Id. Rule 17 (e).
83 Id. Rule 4(e) (10).
84 Note 81 supra. The Utah provision for jurisdiction over non-residents
bears a striking resemblance to the Iowa statute sustained in Doherty v.
Goodman, note 30 supra.
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elements are present, s in spite of broad language used
in the opinion sustaining this statute against constitutional
attack."6
Even if the Utah statute were interpreted to reach
individuals transacting business but not "doing business"
in the state, the state's jurisdiction over non-residents
would be more narrow than the Illinois provision in
several respects: The jurisdictional test for corporate
defendants in Utah remains "doing business";87 the non-
resident individual must have an agent in the state, s and
must also have at least one place of business in the state.8 9
A Florida statute subjects to the jurisdiction of its courts
non-residents who ". . . operate, conduct, engage in, or
carry on a business or business venture in the State of
Florida" in any action ".. . arising out of any transaction
or operation connected with or incidental to such business
or business venture .. ."" The language of this section
would seem to require something more as a basis for
jurisdiction than is required by the Illinois provision.
Whether there is a difference depends on the extent to
which the terms "operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on
85 Dykes v. Reliable Furniture & Carpet, 3 Utah 2d 34, 277 P.2d 969
(1954).
86 Wein v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P.2d 222, 227 (1948), where the
court noted:
"... the trend of authorities away from the strict and narrow hold-
ings of the early cases to the more liberal principle of permitting a
non-resident to be sued in a jurisdiction where he has performed
certain acts or transacted certain business, providing, the cause of
action arose out of the acts or the business transacted ..
and concluded at 229 that:
"To require a non-resident to defend where he commits the alleged
wrong is not an unreasonable imposition."
87 Note 81 supra.
88 Without such an agent, there can be no service of process.
89 The place of business must be in his own name or a common trade
name. Thus, if the place of business is in the name of the agent, the Utah
court is presumably without jurisdiction.
90 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 47.16 (1943). Process is served on a non-resident
by service on the secretary of state.
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a business or business venture" contemplate more activities
than the term "transaction of any business." In sustaining
this provision, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the
term "business venture" so as to include an activity having
little connection with the actual business venture there
involved."
Several states have statutes asserting jurisdiction over
non-residents which are in no way comparable to the
Illinois provision.2 A New Jersey workman's comipensa-
tion provision imposing liability on non-resident em-
ployers " has been sustained." New Ybrk asserts jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations "doing business" in that
state, 95 and over individuals "when any natural person...
not residing in this state shall engage in business in this
state... ."" as to causes of action arising out of the business
in the state. Service of process on a corporation may be by
service on certain designated officials in the state or on the
secretary of state.97 An individual may be served by (1)
personal service within the state, or (2) service within the
91 State ex rel. Weber v. Register, 67 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1953). This was an
action for commission by a broker with whom the non-resident defendants
had listed for sale an orange grove operated by them. The court held that
while the listing for sale was not a transaction or operation connected with
or incidental to the business of operating the orange grove, it was a transac-
tion connected with or incidental to the business venture of acquiring the
grove. Since there was a business venture in the normal sense supporting
jurisdiction, it does not follow that the Florida court would necessarily, or
even probably, interpret the term "business venture" so as to include a
single isolated business transaction.
92 Note 72 supra.
93 N. J. STAT. Ayw. § 34: 15-55.1 (Supp. 1954).
91 Kawko v. Howe & Co., 129 N.J.L. 319, 29 A2d 621 (1943). This deci-
sion was adhered to in Halloran v. Haffner, 25 N. J. Super. 241, 95 A.2d 921
(1953).
95 N. Y. GEN. Cons. LAw § 218. Elish v. St. Louis South Western Ry., 305
N.Y. 267, 112 N.E.2d 842 (1953).
96 CAmT.-PARSONS, NEW Yox CivI PaAcTicE § 229b (2d ed. 1955). The
term "engaged in business" as applied to an individual has been said to be
the same as "doing business" as applied to a corporation. Debrey v. Hanna,
182 Misc. 824, 45 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1943).
97 N. Y. GEw. CoRP. LAw § 217, CAmI-PAnsoNs, NEw Yoan Civm PaAc-
TiCE § 229 (2d ed. 1955).
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state on the person who at the time of the service is in
charge of the defendant's business in New York, if the
defendant is also served either by mail or by personal
service outside the stateY8
The Illinois provision is most nearly like a combination
of the Maryland statute (respecting the scope of activities
on which jurisdiction may be found) and the Florida
statute (respecting the classes of plaintiffs and defend-
ants) .Unlike many states, Illinois does not limit the class
of defendants to non-residents,99 and draws no distinction
between individuals and corporations. Finally, the Illinois
statute differs from all the statutes discussed in that it does
not require substituted service or personal service within
the state.
(2) The Commission of a Tortious Act Within This State.-00
The second of Illinois' four new bases for jurisdiction
may also be described as a break with tradition, though
the departure is perhaps not as startling as the abandon-
ment of the "doing business" concept.' 0
Since Hess v. Pawloski,0 2 the states have asserted juris-
diction over causes of action arising out of single tortious
acts within the state, 0 3 but they have carefully picked
98 CAHILL-PARsoNs, NEw YORK CIVIL PRACTICE § 229b (2d ed. 1955).
99 This eliminates any problem as to applicability of section 17 when
the defendant is a resident of Illinois at the time the cause of action arises
but subsequently becomes a non-resident. This situation is expressly cov-
ered by the Florida statute, note 90 supra.
100 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 110, § 17 (1) (b) (1955).
101 Id. at § 17 (1) (a).
102 Note 29 supra.
103 A statute purporting to give New York courts jurisdiction in an action
against a non-resident operator or owner of aircraft, growing out of an ac-
cident in which the aircraft is involved, regardless of the locus of the acci-
dent, so long as the aircraft "has landed at, or departed from, any airfield
in this state" has been held to violate the due process clause insofar as it
applies to accidents which do not occur within or over the territorial limits
of the state or have no causative connection to acts within or over those
limits. Peters v. Robin Air Lines, 281 App. Div. 903, 120 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2d
Dep't 1953).
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areas which can be said to be subject to the state's police
power.' While not the first state to do so, Illinois now
asserts jurisdiction over causes of action arising out of the
commission of all tortious acts within the state.
A Vermont statute subjects a foreign corporation to the
jurisdiction of its courts if it "commits a tort, in whole or
in part, in Vermont against a resident of Vermont."1 5
In one respect it is broader than section 17(1) (b)-
the tort need not be committed wholly within the state;
in two respects it is narrower - it applies only to foreign
corporations and the tort must be against a resident of the
state. Although the statute was thus qualified, the court
in Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp. 6 considered
the question in its broadest aspects and upheld the power
of the state to base jurisdiction on a single tortious act
within its borders, observing:
The only limitations upon the jurisdiction of the courts
of one of the United States are to be found in the constitu-
tion of the state, the Constitution of the United States,
and the same extensive powers possessed by the other
states of the United States. No express limitation is
known to us in any of these sources which prevents ap-
propriate courts of a state from exercising jurisdiction
over proceedings therein arising out of tortious acts done
within the state, provided always that adequate notice
of the litigation be given to the particular defendant
against whom liability is sought to be enforced. There is
104 (1) The operation of automobiles. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. C. 95 , § 23
(1955).
(2) The operation of aircraft. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 1410 (Pur-
don 1954); ILL. Rnv. STAT. c. 110, § 263a-263c (1955).
(3) The operation of watercraft. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANx. § 13:3479
(West 1951); ILL. REv. STAT. c. 110, § 263a-263c (1955).
105 VT. REv. STAT. § 1562 (1947). Jurisdiction is also given over a foreign
corporation making "a contract with a resident of Vermont to be performed,
in whole or in part, by either party in Vermont." A defendant under this
statute is served by service on the secretary of state. The statute resorts
to a curious legislative definition of "doing business" as the foundation for
the assertion of jurisdiction. This has been ignored and is undoubtedly due
to the fact that the statute preceded the International Shoe case.
106 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
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no arbitrary exercise of the power, since the non-resident
has had the protection of the state's laws while acting
therein. See 34 California Law Review 331, 337.107
The Maryland statute considered in Compania de Astral,
S.A. v. Boston Metals Co.' previously had been con-
sidered and upheld by the federal court in a tort case.'
(3) The Ownership, Use, or Possession of Any Real Estate
in This State.1 °0
Jurisdiction founded on the ownership, use or possession
of Illinois realty will frequently also fall within one of the
other bases for jurisdiction enumerated in section 17."'
However, this classification is not without precedent.
A Pennsylvania statute submits a non-resident owner,
tenant or user of Pensylvania real estate, by virtue of his
"ownership, possession, occupancy, control, maintenance
and use," to the jurisdiction of the courts of that state in
any civil action arising out of any accident or injury in-
107 Id. at 667. While it would seem that the International Shoe case sup-
ports jurisdiction founded on the commission of a tort, the Vermont court
however, was of the view that the Supreme Court of the United States had
never passed on the question of due process in connection with tort liability,
id. at 666-667, and considered the question one of first impression. The court's
development of the jurisdictional concept has received favorable comment:
56 Dicm. L. REv. 257 (1952); 50 MIcH. L. REv. 763 (1952); 36 Mmn. L. REv.
264 (1952); 21 U. CiN. L. REv. 71 (1952); 100 U. PA. L. REv. 598 (1952); 26
N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 713 (1951). Compare, 27 NoTRE DAEVM LAW. 117 (1951), ap-
proving the justice of the holding, but commenting that it represents a de-
parture from traditional requirements of due process.
108 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955). See
text,(1) The Transaction of any Business Within This State, supra.
109 Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md.
1950). The court's holding was based on the fact that the activities of the
non-resident corporation amounted to more than a single isolated transac-
tion. It felt that a single act was not sufficient to support jurisdiction unless
that act was subject to the police power. To this extent the decision is con-
trary to the holding of the Smyth case, note 106 supra. For comments on the
decision see 64 HARv. L. Rsv. 500 (1951); 49 McH. L. R. 881, 885-886 (1950).
-10 ILL. REv. STAT. C. 110, § 17(1) (c) (1955).
11 Note 10 supra. See Miller v. Swann, 170 Misc. 607, 28 N.Y.S.2d 247
(N.Y. City Ct. 1941).
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volving the real estate which occurs in Pennsylvania."'
This statute, limiting jurisdiction to actions involving
accident or injury in connection with the real estate, is not
as broad as section 17(1) (c). However, nothing in the
opinion sustaining the Pennsylvania statute supports the
view that this limitation is essential to its validity."
(4) Contracting to Insure Any Person, Property or Risk
Located within This State at the Time of Contracting."4
Congress has declared that the business of insurance is
subject to the laws of the several states." 5 The Uniform
Unauthorized Insurers Act" subjects a non-resident com-
pany, not authorized to do business in the state but trans-
acting business there or issuing or delivering policies to
residents or citizens, to the jurisdiction of the courts of the
state in any suit arising out of a policy so issued or de-
livered, the commissioner of insurance, ipso facto, being
designated as agent for service of process." 7 This statute
has been sustained where the policy was delivered in the
state to a resident;" otherwise it has been held to have
12 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331 (Purdon 1953). Process is served on a de-
fendant under this provision by service on the secretary of the common-
wealth.
113 Dubin v. Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (1939).
314 IL. REV. STAT. c. 110, § 17 (1) (d) (1955).
325 59 STAT. 34 (1945), as amended by 61 STAT. 448 (1947), 15 U.S.C. §§
1011-1015 (1952).
116 UIuFP UNAUTHORIZED INsuRERs AcT §§ 1-7; 9A UNIrOPu LAWS ANNO-
TATED 347.
n7 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 625.28 (1943); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 175B, §§ 1-6
(1954); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 24.567 (101)- (105) (Supp. 1953); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, §§ 1005.1-1005.6 (Purdon 1953); S.C. CODE §§ 37-261 to 37-272 (1952).
fl8 Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 877 (1953). In Storey v. United Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp.
896 (E.D.S.C. 1946), a motion to quash service was denied, but the validity
of the South Carolina uniform act was not attacked, the only question being
whether the company was engaged in business in South Carolina.
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no application." 9
Section 17(1) (d) is but an extension of the uniform
act to non-residents and non-citizens where the risk in-
sured is within Illinois at the time of insuring. Substituted
service is replaced by actual service.' °
For several years, Illinois has had a provision, patterned
somewhat after the Uniform Unauthorized Insurers Act,
which is in many respects broader than section 17."
Under this provision, an Illinois resident may sue an un-
authorized insurance company by serving the Director of
Insurance and mailing a copy of the process to the com-
pany, where the company by mail or otherwise (a) issues
or delivers policies, (b) solicits applications, (c) collects
premiums or (d) transacts any other business. 2
119 American Farmers Ins. Co. v. Thomason, 217 Ark. 705, 234 S.W.2d 37
(1950). An insurance contract was entered into in California between an
Arizona insurance company and an Arkansas resident temporarily in Cali-
fornia, and an injury within the coverage of the policy was suffered in
California. The Arkansas court held that the statute did not confer juris-
diction over the insurance company which was doing no business in Arkan-
sas at the time of the execution and delivery of the policy in California.
Section 17(1) (d) of the Illinois Civil Practice makes no attempt to assert
jurisdiction in such a case.
120 ILL. Rzv. STAT. c. 110, § 17 (2) (1955).
121 ILL. REv. STAT. c. 73, § 735 (1955). Paragraph 1 of this section states its
purpose:
"(1) The purpose of this Section is to subject certain companies
to the jurisdiction of courts of this state in suits by or on behalf of
insureds or beneficiaries under insurance contracts. The Legislature
declares that it is a subject of concern that many residents of this
state hold policies of insurance issued by companies not authorized
to do business in this state, thus presenting to such residents the
often insuperable obstacle of resorting to distant forums for the pur-
pose of asserting legal rights under such policies. In furtherance of
such state interest, the Legislature herein provides a method of
substituted service of process upon such companies and declares
that in so doing it exercises its power to protect its residents and to
define, for the purpose of this statute, what constitutes doing busi-
ness in this state, and also exercises powers and privileges available
to the state by virtue of Public Law 15, 79th Congress of the United
States, Chapter 20, 1st Sess., S. 340, as amended, which declares
that the business of insurance and every person engaged therein
shall be subject to the laws of the several states."
322 Section 17(1) (d) does not base the assertion of jurisdiction on (b), (c)
or (d). (d) is, of course, within section 17 (1) (a).
[Vol. xx
THE ILLINOIS REVISED PRACTICE. ACT
VI
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORTING EXPANDED
JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENTS
The restrictions imposed on the assertion of jurisdiction
over non-residents by Pennoyer v. Neff ' may once have
been supported by sound policy considerations. However,
changing conditions, resulting from such factors as tech-
nological developments improving the speed and facility
of transportation and the tremendous increase in interstate
commercial activity since that case, required expansion of
its concept of the due process limitations on jurisdiction
over non-residents.' Sound policy reasons support the
enactment by the Illinois legislature of section 17 and these
considerations have received judicial recognition by vari-
ous courts.
Requiring resort to a foreign forum is always incon-
venient and frequently unjust.' - It often makes the pro-
tection of a right prohibitive2 or at least greatly handicaps
it, 12 7 particularly where the claim is small.' In such a case,
the cost of the remedy will largely exceed the value of
its fruits.' A requirement of distant trials permits a
M N,'te 3 supra.
124 "... . Modern life is breaking down State barriers, and as it be-
comes easier to travel, or to do business, or to own property in
other States, one must expect the obligations arising out of such
activities to follow more easily. It is just as important that non-
resident owners of Philadelphia real estate should keep their prop-
erty in such shape as not to injure our citizens as it is that non-
resident owners of cars should drive about our streets with equal
care. It is only a short step beyond this to assert that defendants
in both classes of cases should be answerable in this forum ...
Dubin v. Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61, 64 (1939).
123 Watson v. Employers Liab. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954), rehearing
denied, 348 U.S. 921 (1955); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State
Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643, 648-649 (1950).
126 Wein v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P.2d 222, 228-229 (1948).
127 Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664, 668
(1951).
328 Travelers Health Ass'n case, note 125 supra at 648-649.
129 Smyth case, note 127 supra at 668.
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defendant to say to a plaintiff that the issue between them
over acts done at plaintiff's home can be settled in only
one of two ways - first, by acquiescing in the defendant's
view of the matter, or second, by suing the defendant in
his own bailiwick.3 0 Thus, non-residents could, as a
practical matter, continue in business with immunity from
legal responsibility.' 3 '
On the other hand, the local forum is normally the most
convenient.'32 The witnesses are there33 and ordinarily
the investigation is conducted there.3
Aside from considerations of convenience and justice
to individuals, the state has an interest in the litigation.
Rights will be determined by the laws of the state where
the acts which are the basis of the suit occurred.3 Further-
more, a state has a legitimate interest in injuries occurring
there,'36 particularly since it may be required to care for
the injured.3
It is reasonable to require a non-resident to defend
130 Ibid.
'31 Wein v. Crockett, note 126 supra at 228-229; Smyth v. Twin State Im-
provement Corp., note 127 supra at 668.
132 Watson v. Employers Liab. Corp., note 125 supra at 72; Johns v. Bay
State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654, 663 (D. Md. 1950); Compania
de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357, 368 (1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955); Wetm v. Crockett, note 126 supra at 228;
Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., note 127 supra at 668.
133 Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n note
125 supra at 649; Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., note 132 supra
at 663; Wein v. Crockett, note 126 supra at 228; Smyth v. Twin State Im-
provement Corp., note 127 supra at 668.
134 Travelers Health Ass'n case, note 125 supra.
:35 Compania de Astral, SA. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d
357, 368 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955); Wein v. Crockett, 113
Utah 301, 195 P.2d 222, 229 (1948); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement
Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664, 668 (1951).
136 Watson v. Employers Liab. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 73 (1954), rehearing
denied, 348 U.S. 921 (1955); Wein v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P.2d 222,
230 (1948).
'37 Watson v. Employers Liab. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954), rehearing
denied, 348 U.S. 921 (1955).
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where he commits the wrong.' One who comes into a
state for the purpose of conducting his business should
be amenable to the courts and laws of the state and
answerable to its citizens for damages sustained by them
as a result of the business transacted in the state,"9 and a
state ought, as a matter of justice and fairness, to be
permitted to control the doing of business within its
borders to this extent.40 By engaging in activities within
the state, the non-resident enjoys the benefits and pro-
tection of its laws. His conduct may give rise to obligations.
Certainly as far as obligations arise out of his activities
within the state, a procedure which compels him to respond
to a suit to enforce them is not unfair.'4 '
Illinois is clearly in harmony with the trend toward
the expansion of jurisdiction permitted by the International
Shoe case '1 founded on these sound policy considera-
tions.1 4
3
138 Wein v. Crockett, note 135 supra at 229; Smyth v. Twin State Improve-
ment Corp., note 135 supra at 668.
'39 Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 F.2d 740, 743 (5th Cir. 1944), quoted in Davis-
Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d 615, 622 (1951); Smyth
v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A-2d 664, 668 (1951).
340 Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d 615, 621
(1951).
'4' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
142 Ibid.
'43 Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664, at
668 (1951):
"Extension of the jurisdiction of courts may be expected to con-
tinue in the wake of scientific and economic developments. Facil-
ity of travel has largely effaced state lines. Specific extensions,
including the one under consideration, may generate considerable
difference of opinion as to the reasonableness of assuming jurisdic-
tion over a particular defendant ,or class of defendants. We recog-
nize that there is a dual trend in jurisdictional decisions; in defining
the court with jurisdiction, a trend from the court with immediate
power over the defendant to the court where both parties may most
conveniently settle their dispute; and in defining due process of
law, a trend from emphasis on the territorial limitations of courts
to emphasis on providing notice and opportunity to be heard. The
implications of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington are
a part of this dual trend. Its broad standard we expect will prevail.
Any change will be, most likely, a further extension. See 16 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 525, 533, 536."
19561
NOTRE DAME LAWYER[
CONCLUSION
Section 17 is the first statute to eliminate all fictions
and circuity in asserting jurisdiction over non-residents,
substituting therefor a streamlined and comprehensive
scheme.
Problems undoubtedly will arise as to the interpretation
and application of the new provision, both as to the
particular situations in which the Illinois courts have
jurisdiction and as to the relationship between this pro-
vision and other statutes. The policy considerations which
underlie the statute are those which determine due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The constitutionality
of the statute in a given case can not be successfully
challenged unless the Illinois court incorrectly appraises
these considerations. Only if the Illinois court finds that a
defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of Illinois courts
under this section because his activities amount to "the
transaction of any business" or the "commission of a
tortious act" in the state, when, in fact, his activities in the
state do not satisfy the requirements of the due process
clause, will the Supreme Court of the United States
declare the act unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has used language in cases con-
cerning state jurisdictional limits which is broad enough
to support the extended jurisdictional provisions of the
new Illinois Practice Act. These decisions have shown an
awareness of inherent problems in limiting the boundaries
of state jurisdiction through the due process provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Illinois has taken the lead
in an attempt to solve these problems, guided by the
precedents of other states and with the conviction that
legal rights should not be thwarted by an arbitrary
delimitation of state jurisdiction through the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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